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Abstract 
 School anti-violence programs are united in their radical condemnation of 
aggression, generally equated with violence. The programs advocate its 
elimination by priming children's emotional and cognitive controls. What goes 
unrecognized is the embeddedness of aggression in human beings, as well its 
positive psychological and moral functions. In attempting to eradicate aggression, 
schools increase the risk of student disaffection while stifling the goods 
associated with it: status, power, dominance, agency, mastery, pride, social-
affiliation, social-approval, loyalty, self-respect, and self-confidence. It is argued 
that the distribution to students of power and authority, plausible substitutes for 
aggression, would enable them to express aggression in a legitimated manner 
and simultaneously encourage their attachment to school. A vibrant anti-violence 
program that attracts children will find a way for caring, amiability, sympathy, and 
kindness to live in tandem with competition, power, assertiveness, and anger 
tamed by institutional constraints.  
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 Suppression of the aggressive impulse: Conceptual difficulties in anti-
violence programs 
 
 Schools affirm the affiliative, caring, cooperative impulses of human nature 
while discouraging, to the point of forbidding, aggressive ones. Yet, despite 
prohibitions on violence, as well as broader expressions of aggression, anti-
social behaviors continue to be endemic school problems.1 Appeals to long-term 
self-interest, rationality, empathy, and social cohesion confront children who are 
nonetheless captivated by aggression; it absorbs their out-of-school lives as it 
absorbs the larger culture in which they participate. With five to six violent acts 
per hour on television and an average weekly viewing of 28 hours – and that 
estimate excludes electronic games – violence saturates children's after-school 
lives (Report of the American Psychological Association, 1993). We are hungry 
for aggression while trying to eliminate it. Paul Willis (1997), in his analysis of a 
progressive working class school in England has noted its appeal: 
There is a positive joy in fighting, in causing fights through intimidation, in 
talking about fighting and about the tactics of the whole fight situation. 
Many important cultural values are expressed through fighting. Masculine 
hubris, dramatic display, the solidarity of the group, the importance of 
quick, clear and not over-moral thought, comes out time and again…. 
Violence opposes the conventional with 'machismo.' It is one way to make 
                                                 
1
 I understand aggression to mean, under most circumstances, the intent to inflict harm. It can be verbal, 
psychological or physical. Violence, a form of aggression, involves the use of physical force (Dodge, Coie, 
and Lynam, 2006). 
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the mundane suddenly matter….Boredom and petty detail disappear (p. 
34). 
Unlike other behaviors that educators would like to expunge from children's 
repertoire – thumb sucking, bed wetting, tantrums, biting – the mere progression 
of years is not a predictable cure and reliance on disciplinary policies has been 
unresponsive to the concern.2  
 As teachers and students increasingly report that schools feel unsafe 
(Barton, Coley, Wenglinksy, 1998), an avalanche of anti-violence programs has 
found their way into the curriculum. As with character education, the mounting 
number does not reflect great variety.3 In this paper I review common tenets and 
approaches of the anti-violence programs, arguing that the core features are 
overly repressive. There is an excessive appeal to rationality and pro-social 
emotions, along with a failure to acknowledge the moral and emotional power of 
aggression: features that make it beneficial to human development, as well as 
pervasive and resistant to extinction. This is not to say that the programs are 
unsuccessful. Limited evidence suggests they have had some positive impact 
(Mytton, et al, 2002; Samples and Eber, 1998). Rather the criticism goes to the 
total reproach of aggression and assertiveness that sometimes  includes 
determined striving, and exuberance. 
                                                 
2
 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, Indicators of School Crime and Safety 
(2009), in 2007 over 30% of all teachers found student misbehavior interfered with their teaching, 
over 30% of all students claimed they were victims of bullying, and over 30% of Black and 
Hispanic students reported gangs in their school 
 
3
  Erika Kitzmiller took on responsibility for collecting information on anti-violence programs 
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 The anti-aggressive stance may arise, in part, by equating aggression with 
violence. Yet aggression is often expressed in rational argumentation and 
passionate views; in organized activities such as sports or political campaigns; in 
desires, fantasies, and written work; in self-assertion and protest. Violence, 
ranging from serious to mild, is but one of its forms. Aggression is not necessarily 
destructive; that is the assumption at issue. It can have benevolent as well as 
malevolent intentions and outcomes. When incorporated into the authority 
structure of a social order, it can be a vehicle for fulfilling worthy institutional 
purposes. My argument is that aggression should be valued and channeled 
productively, not buried in an unnatural and eventually futile over-emphasis on 
being amicable and peaceful. If schools foster only the affiliative side of the 
psyche, while trying to silence its assertive aggressive face, they miss an 
opportunity for fully engaging children, cultivating other beneficial characteristics, 
allowing them authentic voice, and sustaining a vibrant community. 
 In what follows I initially sketch the themes of anti-violence programs: their 
condemnation of aggression, their advocacy of developing children's emotional 
and cognitive controls. Next I discuss the entrenched hold of aggression in 
humans as critical to fulfillment as affiliation and attachment. In the third section I 
review the goods of aggression, both psychological and moral. As an outlet for 
more seriously motivated aggression, I suggest in section four that power and 
authority be distributed to students. Power may be sought simply because it 
enhances a sense of self or injures another, but it may also be sought as an 
instrument of justice (getting-even, fairness). If student power-seeking is shaped 
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and legitimized by a school, rather than arising through random encounters and 
often turned against the school, then aggressiveness may find a socially 
acceptable conduit. When a child is given power to further institutional objectives 
– from oversight of a group charged with cleaning the lunch tables to participating 
in a disciplinary proceeding – she may experience the range of satisfactions that 
aggression affords: status, power, dominance, agency, mastery, pride, social-
affiliation, social- approval, loyalty, self-respect, and moral self-confidence. The 
anger and hostility formerly associated with inter-personal aggression might 
even, in some instances, mutate into anger and hostility associated with 
violations of school norms to which students are committed. The resolution then 
becomes less about getting personal satisfaction than about securing a just 
resolution. Such a depersonalization of aggression – I am angry not because of 
what you did to me but because of what you did to the community – would also 
buttress the school culture and students' adherence to it. Securing this 
engagement is itself a factor in preventing violence, as acknowledged by the 
American Psychological Association (2008). Offering genuine authority to 
students, within the framework of a school's legitimated goals, adds to power-
exertion an opportunity for autonomous decision-making, thereby increasing a 
student's range of influence. It is suggested as supplemental to the suppression 
of assertiveness in anti-violence programs.  
Anti-violence programs and the suppression of aggression 
 To select a subset of anti-violence programs for review, we consulted four 
sources: The National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices 
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(NREPP), a service of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (2008); 
Blueprints for Violence Prevention by the Center for the Study and Prevention of 
Violence (2008); The Model Program's Guide by the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Preventions (MPG) (2008); and a review by Leff and associates 
(2001). Each of these sources had conducted comprehensive searches to 
determine programs of the highest scientific merit. From the top-rated ones we 
eliminated those that were directed primarily to drugs, alcohol, and smoking; 
were therapeutic rather than preventive or home-based; and did not continue 
beyond first grade.  This yielded 13 programs.4 We then surveyed their relevant 
web sites and related articles.  
 Generally programs are oriented to elementary and middle school 
students. Curricula are spelled out in teacher manuals and bundled into discrete 
lessons totaling roughly 10 to 25 hours. Lectures, discussions and rule 
development may be supplemented with DVD's, puppets, cued conversations, 
role-playing, in vivo demonstrations, rehearsal (of positive behaviors), posters, 
photos, and parent training. 
 The pervasive aspiration is that children should be calm, cooperative, and 
pro-social. Adults, in turn, should establish a classroom atmosphere that is 
kindly, warm, and caring, while remaining firmly in charge. Aggression, and more 
                                                 
4
 Brain Power; Coping Power; Early Risers: Skills for Success; Incredible Years Training for 
Children; Linking the Interests of Families and Teachers (LIFT); Olweus Bullying Prevention 
Program; PeaceBuilders; Positive Action; Promoting Alternative thinking Strategies (PATHS); 
Resolving Conflicts Creatively Program (RCCP); Responding in Peaceful and Positve Ways 
(RIPP); Second Step; Too Good for Violence. 
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broadly impulsive behavior, is to be eliminated. Schools should strive to become 
peaceful sanctuaries. Much of the programmatic content concentrates on 
developing children's capacity for inhibition. In so far as possible, children should 
avoid confrontational situations. If unable to do so, they should ignore 
provocations, walk away from put-downs, and inhibit their anger. They are 
taught, and afforded opportunities to practice, non-responsiveness to aggression. 
For example, in Linking the Interests of Families and Teachers (LIFT), children 
are advised to withdraw from teasing by going into their turtle shells where ‘[i]t's 
nice and warm and safe. You can't get into trouble and have time to think about 
what you can do to keep from getting into trouble’ (Eddy, Reid, and Fetrow, 2000, 
p. 169). Impulses to instigate aggression should be ‘managed’ and ‘controlled.’ 
Words such as self-control, self-discipline, self-management, emotional 
regulation, frustration tolerance, anger management, and pro-social problem 
solving are rampant in program descriptions. As noted by Lyn Mikel Brown, we 
ask girls always to be ‘nice and kind’ and boys to ‘never lash out’ (2009, p.5). We 
burden children with expectations that adults would refuse: to obey all rules 
regardless of their apparent unfairness and never to resist the aggression of 
others.  
 In addition to these extraordinary demands on inhibitory powers, students 
are asked, as a means of distancing themselves from confrontations, to invoke 
sophisticated cognitive processes: to recognize emotions (in themselves and 
others); label what they feel as a way of increasing self-control; develop empathy 
and insight into the aggressor's mental state, thereby achieving perspective on 
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the conflict at hand; understand the likelihood of making misattributions, that is 
the tendency to perceive an event – a bump or spilled lunch tray – as hostile, 
when it is accidental.  
 Consider, as an example, the popular Second Step anti-violence program 
that extends from kindergarten through eighth grade. According to its web page 
(2009), in thirty lessons given once or twice a week, children learn and practice 
skills of ‘anger management, cooperation, respectful behavior, and problem 
solving. These skills help decrease students' negative and violent behaviors – 
fighting, name-calling, and stereotyping.’  In each grade there are units on 
empathy training, impulse control, problem solving, and anger management. 
Under empathy, fourth-grade children (my random choice) are instructed to 
recognize and understand that people have different reactions to the same 
situation, they have conflicting feelings, feelings change, and one can recognize 
others' feelings from their physical and verbal behavior. Students should be wary 
of attributing hostile impulses to others and show concern for them.  Under 
impulse control and problem solving, fourth-graders practice calming-down, 
giving and receiving compliments, brainstorming solutions rather than acting 
impulsively, keeping conversations friendly, taking responsibility by 
acknowledging mistakes and apologizing. Under anger management, fourth-
graders are again taught to recognize the signs of anger, calm down, reflect, and 
problem-solve. Cognitive understanding and emotional repression are the 
solutions for anger. Other recourses are not offered. 
 11
 The programs are clear on their normative values. There are good and 
bad acts, good and bad (or positive and negative) emotions. Aggression and 
anger are bad (often euphemized as ‘inappropriate’) and do nothing to resolve 
conflict; nonviolent norms should be inculcated. Pro-social problem solving, that 
is maintaining peaceful interactions, is good. For example, Resolving Conflicts 
Creatively (RCCP) asserts categorically that aggression does not resolve 
conflicts. Instead it urges children to use ‘I messages’ – referencing their own 
feelings rather than blaming others.  
 Aggressive students are widely perceived as problematic: they are socially 
inept, have deficits in social information processing and, if their behaviors remain 
unaltered, are likely to become delinquent. They ‘tend to be suspicious of others, 
have difficulty reading nonverbal cues, and often misinterpret ambiguous events 
as hostile. Socially, children at risk for violence insult their peers, disrupt 
classroom activities, and engage in higher rates of physical and verbal 
aggression than socially competent children’  (Embry and Associates 1996, pp. 
91-92). Since aggression is believed to be largely the product of the primary 
caretakers' negativism, permissiveness, and power-assertion (spanking and 
violent verbal outbursts), the school must provide an alternative model. 
 Admittedly, there is some variation to the bad-child view. RCCP 
recognizes that cultural factors can be the source of aggressive norms and 
behaviors, though that does not make aggression more tolerable. While 
prohibiting aggression, RCCP also acknowledges that conflict is an inevitable 
part of life to be handled by teaching and negotiation. By mutual consent peer 
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mediators are engaged in dispute resolution. The emphasis, however, is on 
problems to be solved, not wrongs to be righted. Aggression has no claim to 
moral standing. 
 The programs emphasize peace and amicability rather than justice. They 
are inattentive to the compelling moral clashes that often promote aggression, 
and the moral satisfactions resulting from self-assertion. They do not address, 
perhaps because they cannot resolve, the dilemma of children living in conflicting 
worlds of conflicting values and the possibility that their behavior gains moral 
approbation and is adaptive (Ferguson, 2000). Despite contrary prevailing norms 
in their communities, and often in their families, students are expected to accept 
school principles, to regulate their emotions and manage their anger accordingly.
 In condemning aggressive acts, schools reject a world view adhered to by 
many. Where aggression is most conspicuous – in our inner-city largely ethnic-
minority schools – it also meets with most social approval as a form of achieving 
justice and social status (Anderson, 1999; Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998). This 
rejection has to be openly faced: students must be persuaded that there is more 
honor in walking away from a confrontation than in resisting it; that turning to 
adults for assistance is preferable to handling conflicts themselves. It may be a 
hard sell, for ‘telling an adult is anathema’ (Ferguson, 2000, p.181), and 
aggression is justified by values of respect and fairness.  
The embeddedness of aggression 
 The classical theorists of aggression have long disputed whether it is a 
native instinct or an acquired motive, but they agree that, like the drive for 
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affiliation, it is easily primed. Both emotional states make their appearance in 
infancy, are shaped by parenting and social context, yet appear to be 
experienced as primitives. A casual observation of toddlers reveals that they 
hunger for intimacy and attachment, while they eagerly do battle against any 
human or non-human obstacle interrupting their pursuits. A child who did not go 
after her wants – a parent, bottle, or toy – would be as aberrant as one who did 
not pursue parental attachment. Indeed, aggression has been noted to reach its 
peak in the preschool years and to diminish through socialization thereafter 
(Dodge, Coie, and Lynam, 2006). 
 It has long been acknowledged that we may well be endowed, or quickly 
acquire, a dual nature. ‘In the same individual we find infinite capacity for 
tenderness, sympathy, charity, love, and infinite capacity for cruelty, callousness, 
destruction, hate’ (Ardrey, 1966, p.285). And, as with many polarities, the two 
ends are closely connected. Even in the case of a familiar toddler, one often 
cannot predict if, when stimulated, she will respond aggressively or affiliatively. 
Later, in a school situation, when under threat she may equally unpredictably 
seek the teacher's support or lash out at the offender. Suggesting their 
evolutionary roots, Konrad Lorenz (1966) and Robert Ardrey (1966) noted the 
proximity of love and hate in the animal kingdom as well. Objects of love are also 
objects of aggression and the two responses often occur simultaneously. 
Amongst humans enmity and amity are not just occasionally commingled but, 
according to some, fully interdependent: ‘[I]t is E – enmity, hostility, antagonism, 
aggression, however you may care to express it – that is the major ingredient in 
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amity's making’ (Ardrey, 1966, p. 271). Threat by an enemy (another gang, the 
‘wrong’ kids) can result in the suspension of mutual antagonisms: ‘With every 
addition to the value of E, there has been produced an additional value of A’ 
(Ardrey, 1966, p. 274). When enmity subsides so too does amity. More recently, 
it has been noted (Phillips and Taylor, 2009) that aggression is the counterpart to 
love and affection, often closely linked to caring about moral wrongs. 
 Lorenz observed in animals (mostly geese) that bonding is enhanced by 
aggression. Creatures who live together entirely peaceably do not form strong 
attachments. ‘[A]n individual friendship  is found only in animals with highly 
developed intra-specific aggression; in fact, this bond is the firmer, the more 
aggressive the particular animal and species is’ (1966, p.216)….’[I]ntra-specific 
aggression can certainly exist without its counterpart, love, but conversely there 
is no love without aggression’ (1966, p. 217). Lorenz bemoans that man in his 
civilized state, ‘suffers from insufficient discharge of his aggressive drive’ (1966, 
p. 243). 
 Unquestionably aggression, along with love, altruism and sexuality, can be 
inhibited or redirected. This is true at the individual and group level. There are 
communities in which violence prevails (for instance the Ik described by Colin 
Turnbull, 1972) and in which cooperation prevails (Eskimo and Amish, see 
Montague, 1976). Unlike Lorenz's goslings (1963) that, upon hatching, are 
imprinted by and then faithfully follow the goose (or person) they first see, our 
behaviors, despite predispositions, are not under full genetic control. An ongoing 
theoretical dispute is whether the aggressive disposition in humans must be 
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discharged or can be eliminated without a serious detrimental impact. Lorenz 
was aligned with the must-be-released camp. If not redirected – banging the 
table or battling it out in ritualized games – aggression will cause unbearable 
dammed-up tensions. By contrast, the anthropologist Ashley Montagu (1976) 
maintained that the disposition can be inhibited or unlearned through a social 
environment that meets the child's need for support and attention, for humans 
are by nature ‘neither naked apes nor fallen angels’ (p. 315); they are what they 
are made.    
The psychiatric tradition is also steeped in a dualistic drive theory. Sigmund 
Freud wrote of the two dominating drives as life and death, love (libido, eros) and 
hate (aggression). Initially the two drives are fused, expressed in infancy by 
undifferentiated agitation or excitement. With development, libidinal and 
aggressive satisfactions can be recognized independently yet are regularly 
blended in varying proportions. Against the conventional Victorian views of his 
day, Freud (1961) adamantly and pessimistically asserted that aggression, along 
with eros, is ‘an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and …that 
it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization’ (p. 69):  
‘[M]en are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most 
can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, 
creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a 
powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them 
not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts 
them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for 
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work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to 
seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and 
to kill him…. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human 
beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration…. 
Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's 
aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check 
(1961, pp 58-59). 
Freud also saw aggression as acquired as well as innate. It can be a secondary 
reaction to helplessness, dependency, and frustration; it can be inhibited, 
repressed, displaced to other objects and pursuits, and sublimated (replaced 
rather than displaced), but it is tenacious (Freud, 1932/1953; Freud, 1950; Freud, 
1961; Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenstein 1949; Van Haute and Geyskens, 2007). 
 Anna Freud and her colleague Dorothy Burlingham (1943, 1972), astute 
observers of children, also concluded that aggression, like the pro-social drive, is 
innate and primary; children are born ‘savages.’  
If we observe young children at play, we notice that they will destroy their 
toys, pull off the arms and legs of their dolls or soldiers, puncture their 
balls, smash whatever is breakable, and will only mind the result because 
complete destruction of the toy blocks further play (1943, p. 22).   
Parenting in the early years is substantially about limiting their aggressive and 
destructive drives. 
 On the other hand, John Dollard, the psychological counterpart to Ashley 
Montagu, concluded that ‘aggression is always a consequence of frustration’ 
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caused by obstruction in achieving a goal and not innate (1939, p.1, italics in 
original). Frustration does not necessarily produce aggression, but it is the sole 
trigger. While no environmental manipulations can eliminate frustration, because 
aggression is a conditioned response it can be inhibited by the anticipation of 
punishment. 
 Whether instinct, predisposition, or learned, that we are an aggressive 
species is obvious. Why is aggression compelling, given its obvious detrimental 
effects? 
The goods of aggression  
 Contrary to Dollard (1939), it would seem that the intense pleasure 
derived from aggression is, alone, sufficient to obliterate calculations of 
consequences. The joy in pitting oneself against another, the exhilaration and 
exhaustion that accompany impassioned defiance, the thrill of domination are 
hard to match (Campbell, 1993; Opotow, 1991; Willis, 1977). Children have a 
compelling itch to fight, so compelling that hostility is not generally its primary 
cause, rather its effect (Bovet, 1923; Peterson and Flanders, 2005). ‘They like to 
start them [fights] watch them and hear about them’ (Opotow, 1991, p. 420; also, 
Lightfoot, 1997). They tease and irritate others as a pretext to get on with the 
fight, or they abandon pretexts and engage in play fighting strictly for the fun of it. 
The strong sense of agency and heightened arousal offers a heady contrast to 
the insipid ‘mawkish and dishwatery’ (James, 1910, p.13) conditions of peaceful 
relationships.  
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Pure good soon grows insipid….[E]veryone reads the accidents and 
offences in a newspaper, as the cream of the set: a whole town runs to be 
present at a fire, and the spectator by no means exults to see it 
extinguished (Hazlitt, 2005, p.105).  
There is the added heroic dimension, particularly for adolescents, of courting 
danger, risking outcomes, defying probabilities, breaking rules, and making 
dramatic displays (Fagan and Wilkinson, 1998). Under such psychological 
conditions, it is unsurprising if negative adult admonitions are ignored. While a 
perpetrator may acknowledge that aggression carried out in revenge for an 
attack or initiated as a put-down of the other is self-defeating, and that strife 
begets strife, when his anger is aroused such considerations have little hold; he 
is likely to find it self-enhancing. 
 Beyond the intrinsic pleasure, aggression and violence serve worthy 
instrumental functions. Without expressions of anger, there cannot be mutual 
understanding. According to the contemporary philosopher, Mary Midgley:  
 [T]he wish to collide, to invade another's world, is a real one. Without that 
contact, each child would be isolated. Each needs the direct physical 
clash, the practical conviction that others as well as himself are capable 
both of feeling pain and of returning it. Surprising though it may be, that 
interaction lies at the root of sympathy. The young of other social animals 
play in the same mildly aggressive way, and derive the same sort of bond-
forming effects from it (1984, p.89). 
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We should welcome our aggressive drives, claims Midgley, for strong social 
attachments are dependent upon physical attack and resistance: 
Besides play, however, children also need at times more serious clashes. 
Real disputes, properly expressed and resolved, seem essential for their 
emotional unfolding. In this way they begin to get a fuller sense of the 
independent reality of others. They find that there is somebody at the 
other end….A quarrel which is worked through and made up can be 
profoundly bond-forming.… Mild, occasional anger is a necessary part of 
all social relations (1984, p.89). 
 According to the psychology of Alfred Adler (1930; Ansbacher and 
Ansbacher, 1956), the goal of children from earliest infancy is to overcome 
inherent feelings of inferiority by resisting submission and achieving superiority. 
Their basic orientation to the world is therefore hostile. Observing children at 
play, Adler noted how they want to be top of the heap, play the driver rather than 
the horse; in my observations, be the parent not the baby, dictate the game rules 
to insure winning, keep control over an activity and rebuff proffered help even 
when that help would be facilitative. To deny them self-assertion is to increase 
their sense of inadequacy. 
 While, in contrast to Adler and Midgley, one constantly observes 
relationships (and whole societies) that apparently thrive without aggression, 
Freud might contest a description of ‘thriving’ that involves so much repression. 
All long-term close relationships, he claimed, contain ‘a sediment of feelings of 
aversion and hostility’ (1951, p.54). In schools, even where overt fighting is rare, 
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children  who may not express hostility towards their friends still regularly share 
with them a common hostility towards others. Intimacy and comradeship are 
enhanced by gossip, harassment, bullying, teasing and ganging-up on other 
students (Campbell, 1993; Johnson and Johnson, 1966; Simmons, 2002; 
Wiseman, 2002). These individual and small group behaviors, so pervasive as to 
seem required for closeness, can be extended to a school or society. Lesko 
(1988), observing a Catholic school, noted that its major themes were caring and 
contest. Lorenz (1963), describing larger social groups, commented that, ‘the 
feeling of togetherness which is so essential to the serving of a common cause is 
greatly enhanced by the presence of a definite, threatening enemy whom it is 
possible to hate’ (p. 285). Similarly Freud observed: ‘It is always possible to bind 
together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other 
people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness’ (1961, p. 
61).  
 While common enmities strengthen collective goodwill, within-group 
aggression also produces recognition, respect, and power (Anderson, 1999; 
Campbell, 1993; Hartup, 1974; Hemmings, 2003; Simmons, 2002; Willis, 1977; 
Wiseman, 2002). Obtaining respect can be dependent on domination. 
Aggression further appeases moral claims of justice (Opotow, 2006). For 
students, revenge (pay back) and retribution (punishment) are often perceived as 
morally compelled, although unprovoked aggression is condemned (Astor, 1994). 
Preschool children, easily swayed by adult injunctions and reliant upon adults for 
both protection and punishment, will condemn hitting back, but older children 
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often approve of a blow for a blow. Equalizing the parties' power restores a moral 
balance (Piaget, 1965). If retaliation is inhibited, the thwarted drive for revenge 
may persist for years with a consequent lowering of self-worth. When satisfied, it 
relieves one's suffering while restoring self-esteem, identity and pride (Frijda, 
2007). An extensive philosophical literature speaks to the virtue of justified anger 
and resentment (Brudholm, 2008; Fridja, 1994; Jacoby,1983; Murphy and 
Hampton, 1988; Murphy, 2003). 
 In our society revenge is taboo, while in honor societies it is obligatory. We 
see it as instigating counter-aggression; others see it as a deterrent, a rational 
strategy inducing cooperation (Fridja, 1994). According to Susan Jacoby (1983) 
our real objection is not to vengeance itself but to uncontrolled vengeance for, 
properly administered, proportional revenge is core to our justice system. She 
goes on to argue that measured retribution is also central to rehabilitation.  
The ancient concept that an offender must pay a penalty before being 
restored to society embodies a profound psychological as well as social 
need – and embodies it for the criminal as well as the victim p.179….[T]he 
elimination of retribution as a legitimate social value rules out any 
possibility of genuine atonement and forgiveness (p. 330). 
 Obviously aggression is problematic and violence beyond a scuffle 
unacceptable in schools. Fighting, furthermore, can thwart as well as achieve just 
resolutions, undermine as well as bolster self-esteem, cause as well as release 
stress, create as well as resolve animosities, deny as well as offer respect, 
alienate as well as bond, produce helplessness as well as competence. For 
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every winner there is a loser. With so much at stake, it is unsurprising that 
schools are reluctant to indulge students' passion, even if they see the upside. 
Instead of assertiveness, anger, indignation and conflict they urge respectful 
discourse. If one is insulted, talk it out with a neutral party, understand and find 
compassion for the other; if one is victimized or treated unfairly, tell a teacher, 
don't retaliate in word or deed. Students should stay calm and rational, keep their 
fury suppressed. The desire to mitigate one's own suffering by another's 
suffering, though universal or near-universal (Fridja, 1994), is deemed unworthy. 
Robert Solomon's argument that revenge against evil lies ‘at the very foundation 
of our sense of justice, indeed, of our very sense of ourselves, our dignity, and 
our sense of right and wrong’ (1994, p.305) is rejected. Nonetheless, where 
psychological and moral considerations are in tension with school policies, on 
both pragmatic and ethical grounds it is questionable if just one set of values 
should be legislated for. A deeper understanding of, and respect for, aggression 
as an aspect of life not without value would enrich school life. 
 The problem is not that schools encourage children's sympathy and 
kindness; it is, rather, their extreme condemnation of aggression combined with 
lack of interest in finding viable alternative outlets. By daily dampening and 
managing children's feelings, schools risk extinguishing their spiritedness, 
substituting apathy along with repressed (often temporarily) rage. As Polakow 
(1992) has noted despairingly, the constant attempt to control, manipulate, and 
suppress behavior results, if successful, in excessive domination and 
domestication of youth. By adults insisting so steadily on submission to their 
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demands, by denying student agency, disengagement is all but inevitable. While 
this is intended benevolently, the recipient experiences a coercion and power 
denied to him. Of course students must learn restraint – that is a major task of 
socialization – but so too, I am suggesting, must educators restrain their 
impulses to repress.  
 We should listen to children who believe fights are more constructive than 
destructive (Furguson, 2000, Opotow, 1991). We should ask how schools can 
develop substitutes for aggression that will satisfy their students. We should heed 
the findings that whereas serious violence is rare and not increasing, disruptive 
behavior is common and probably increasing (American Psychological 
Association Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008; Barton, 2001; Johnson and 
Johnson, 1996). Why the disruption and what are alternatives to it? Are there 
institutional structures that can transcend an I-win-he-loses form of aggression, 
yet still leave students feeling powerful?  
Legitimizing aggression through power and authority 
 Although unfettered aggression is ethically unjustified, while causing 
physical and psychological harm, gratifications from exercising power can have 
good outcomes. The institutionalized distribution of power to students, we 
suggest,, may diminish the pressure for combative outlets and simultaneously 
enhance social responsibility along with school allegiance. In transferring power 
to students, the teacher draws them into the normative network of the classroom, 
thereby co-opting their loyalty. A child is more likely to connect with a school in 
which she is part of the power structure. Contrariwise, the arrogation of all official 
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control by teachers seeds natural student resistance. Given their quest for power, 
and the absence of approved school outlets, it also makes more probable inter-
student nastiness, bullying, cliques, and violence.  
 The power a teacher shares can be minimal as in directing a student to 
gather homework papers and lead a class line, or maximal as in shared 
disciplinary decisions and participation in teacher hires. However, while power 
from a teacher is likely to increase a child's sense of agency, there are limitations 
to informal teacher-distributed power: First, as long as shared power is at the 
discretion of the teacher, and not woven into institutional structures, the child, in 
carrying out the teacher's directives, is merely deputized to fulfill tasks as 
directed. The teacher retains the real power, granting and retracting it as she 
sees fit. The student is bound to her will, making the power ephemeral and the 
child without a claim. Second, power exerted by students may be as oppressive 
as power exerted by teachers; the possessor's fulfillment coincident with the 
subject's resentment. Third, although obtaining power should increase the child's 
identification with school norms, the identification is subject to failure absent prior 
commitment to those norms (Cuban, 1993). When, for instance, a student given 
a negotiating role in a dispute resolution believes the process is rigged, with only 
a limited subset of outcomes permitted, she will not welcome the power.  
 To address these difficulties, power, whenever possible, must be 
transformed into authority. Authority, unlike power, requires a legitimizing source 
that restricts its range and prevents arbitrariness. That source can come from the 
mission (culture) of the school, the charisma of the teacher, the perceived value 
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of the instruction, or the interest of the task. Power, according to Max Weber 
(1947), ‘is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests’ (p.152). A teacher who holds or delegates power 
alone can claim no justification beyond, ‘Because I say so.’ Her success in 
wielding it depends on the availability and effectiveness of sanctions. Obedience 
to authority, by contrast, is premised on ‘a certain minimum of voluntary 
submission’ (p.324). It is the voluntariness of submission by individuals or 
groups, to commands accepted as valid, that makes authority legitimate, just as 
involuntary submission to commands perceived as illegitimate marks power 
relationships. Authority, explains Phillip Selznick (1992), 
may be defined as a rightful claim to deference or obedience….We cannot 
make sense of authority if we do not distinguish it from naked power. 
Authority generates a kind of power – the power to win assent, deference, 
obedience – but its distinctive basis is a recognized claim of right. The 
claim to deference must be accepted as rightful by a relevant class of 
persons. (p. 266, italics in original).  
 Note the emphasis on the ‘relevant class’ that grants consent. When an 
administrator secures a teacher's compliance through threat of sanctions she has 
lost her authority just as the teacher whose student refrains from cheating 
because of the consequences he anticipates, or whose conduct more generally 
is ruled by grades and external discipline, has lost hers. Without the legitimacy of 
the demand, the obedience of such a student is coerced. Eventually, as 
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alienation from the institution increases, the consequences may also lose their 
bite so that compliance is degraded. Grades and discipline may serve as 
bulwarks of, or incentives for, authority; alone they cannot establish it and may 
not even succeed in sustaining it. 
 One who exercises authority retains, in addition to legitimacy, a degree of 
discretion denied the pure power implementer. Even in hierarchical bureaucratic 
organizations, where employees fulfill explicitly delineated roles, the bureaucrat, 
according to Weber, is expected to perform independently and imaginatively. 
Their selection for employment is premised on expertise; exercising judgment is 
essential to the employee's success (Weber, 1947; 1968). The extent of freedom 
will vary depending on the nature of the organization: a physician in a managed 
care setting presumably has more independence than a dental hygienist in the 
same practice; principals have more freedom than teachers, teachers more than 
students, older students more than younger ones. However, when freedom 
approaches zero and the exercise of discretion is stifled, one (teacher or student) 
is increasingly either subject to, or an enactor of, pure power. The child assigned 
to be a line leader or to collect papers exercises only proxy power: he has no 
authority because he has no discretion. Only when he independently considers 
the options and determines how best to carry out the task can he be said to 
possess authority. On the other hand, when freedom approaches 100% it 
operates in a vacuum of constraints; there is, then, no legitimating source that 
can compel adherence to decisions (Swidler, 1979). In a shift to extreme 
freedom, the support and delimitations established by higher order purposes (the 
 27
legitimizing principles) are lost. Whenever genuine authority exists, there is a 
combination of power and freedom (Simon, 1940). 
 To establish genuine authority relationships in a school, students need to 
be persuaded that what the school demands of them they want for themselves. 
In the early elementary grades this is usually unproblematic; they readily identify 
with school goals as they have with parental values and interests. With maturity, 
however, the child is pulled towards non-parental and non-school identifications 
and for many students consent to authority must be co-opted. I do not use the 
term pejoratively. The induction of children into a belief system that they can 
adhere to, at least provisionally, is part of their identity formations. Active consent 
keeps the will of the subordinate engaged. When the subordinate agrees that a 
rule is fair, for instance that not doing home-work or cheating violates norms to 
which he as well as the teacher subscribe, his obedience feels self-imposed 
rather than commanded from above. Obedience is then an act of freedom not 
repression. 
 Consent is often secured by a teacher's superior knowledge, use of lively 
assignments, or strong personality. The durability of such person-dependent 
legitimacy, though much to be admired, is fragile, reliant upon the gifts of 
particular teachers. More compellingly it lacks the connection between an 
individual and those stable, school-wide (or more broadly based), publicly 
endorsed shared values to which all students can form loyalties (Swidler, 1979). 
When consent emanates from institutional mandates or missions, legitimacy 
comes ‘from above’ and the personal appeal of the teacher is not required to 
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secure it. Teacher and student are bound to the same authority not of their own 
devising. Kenneth Strike (2003) has summarized the nature of a school mission.  
A shared educational project has a vision of the education it wishes to 
provide, which is known to and agreed upon by the members of the 
community. This vision is rooted in a common vision of human flourishing, 
and it involves aims that require cooperation in order to secure. This is the 
basis for articulating roles within the community. It grounds the 
community's educational practices, rituals, and traditions, grounds the 
community's governance practices, and is the basis of the community's 
ability to achieve the goods of community such as belonging, loyalty, 
mutual identification, and trust (p.74. original italics removed). 
 Strike emphasizes the social values of commonality, community, and 
cooperation. Within a mission-driven institution, whether it tends towards the 
conservative as in some military and religious schools or the liberal as in 
democratic schools, there is the opportunity for students to be given authority.   
Kim Hays (1994), describing military boarding schools, notes that the cadet 
officer ‘has the right and the responsibility to make his own choices: to consider 
the safety of his men, the morality of his orders, and the dictates of his 
conscience in the context of the group's goals, and then to decide what steps to 
take’ (p. 48). Further, before issuing an order, leaders consult underlings who 
can object, offer suggestions and criticisms, and even decide to disobey if they 
think it illegal. Though difficult to carry out, there is an ‘ideal of shared authority 
based on trust and dialogue’ (p. 175). The structured, moralized roles provide 
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outlets for pride, power, self-respect, influence, approval, and justice thereby 
absorbing impulses that promote aggression.  
 In democratic schools considerable authority is disseminated to students 
who, directly or through representative legislatures, make decisions binding on 
others and accepted by them. Students may have substantial say over the 
agendas and extensive decision-making power, but to sustain their authority, 
they must abide by common premises that legitimate and shape it. For the Just 
Schools, initiated by Lawrence Kohlberg and colleagues, that norm was justice. 
While giving students a major voice in discipline and student life, it was assumed 
that decisions were premised on fairness to the interests of all (Power, Higgins, 
and Kohlberg, 1989a). Like military schools, democratic schools are committed to 
a moral vision. The ‘most distinctive feature,’ according to their major chronicler 
F. Clark Power, ‘was not the use of participatory democracy but the goal of 
becoming a moral community…a group that shares an explicit commitment to a 
common life characterized by norms embodying high moral ideals’ (2004, p.50). 
These include the master virtues of ‘caring, trust, collective responsibility, and 
participation’ (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg, 1989b, p.138). The alternative 
venues for aggression provided by military schools are also found in the moral 
authority assumed by students in democratic schools.   
Conclusion 
 I have observed my city celebrating a World Series victory. Even those not 
participating in the massive celebration were filled with high spirits, pride, and a 
heightened sense of well-being. Having prevailed over all opposition, we were 
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number one, the best. It would have sounded absurd to suggest that the 
celebrants be sensitive to the losers, consider their feelings, and modestly reject 
the glory that was ours. This was our conquest, our venue for aggressive 
pleasures. 
 Children, I have argued, also deserve an opportunity to release 
aggression, not just the animal-spirited aggression of sports but aggression 
arising from motives for control, status, and moral anger. A vibrant school that 
attracts children will find a way for caring, amiability, sympathy, and kindness to 
live in tandem with competition, assertiveness, anger, power, and authority. 
Competition is good when against oneself or rival teams, classes, and schools. 
Assertiveness is good when provoked by creativity, leadership, achievement, and 
righteous causes. Anger is good when provoked by injustice to person or group. 
Power and authority are good when tamed by institutional constraints. As Anna 
Freud and Dorothy Burlingham contended, good education directs the 
aggression to ‘fight the difficulties of the outer world – to accomplish tasks of all 
kinds, to measure one's strength in competition’ (1943, p.23). 
 The difficulty lies in getting the institutional constraints right. An 
excessively authoritarian mission, even when accepted by the school and its 
community, can be as damaging to student education as the absence of 
purpose. Too single-minded a mission will depress individuality and self-
expression (for teachers as well as students), even as it allows students to 
exercise power. Public schools that compel attendance cannot emulate the 
military or Amish community. We are not preparing students for war or religious 
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redemption, but for living responsibly in a world where many fellow citizens will 
disagree with them. Weaker missions, as in democratic schools, also have 
vulnerabilities. Commitments to fairness, participation, and collective 
responsibility may be poorly constrained. What happens when a few strong 
students form a majority and outvote the weaker but perhaps wiser minority? 
Their penalties may be too severe, attitudes too unforgiving, vision too short-
term. Adults then overrule the democratically made judgments and students feel 
undermined. When rules are few and determined by many through elected 
procedures, space is created for demagogues. Under both over- or under-
constrained missions, a few may have positions of power while the bulk of 
students are shut out. 
 To be sure, schools exist that apparently can sustain a productive learning 
atmosphere without self-consciously creating an explicit legitimizing authority, 
social solidarity, or student authority. Their mission, like gravity, is ambient. If 
pressed they might articulate it as the maximization of academic and personal 
growth, promotion of high expectations, opportunities for inquiry and participation 
(Louis and Miles, 1990; Newmann, 1996; Mosher, Kenny and Garrod, 1994). 
Because the individualistic goals are internalized by most, a strong group mission 
is unnecessary: children meet the tasks presented, that's what one does. The 
culture is sufficiently assimilated that a relatively relaxed atmosphere is 
maintained and teachers have few ‘discipline’ problems. Issues of boredom and 
passivity may arise, but not significant aggression or power struggles. Though 
even in such settings one might advocate shared authority, the urgency is 
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considerably less than in schools where extensive and repressive control is 
exercised by adults, and students have not accepted the school conventions. In 
such settings, where buy-in is scant and teachers highly authoritarian, the 
experiment of distributing authority to students might have the biggest pay-off. 
Not able to call upon a shared if unvoiced ambient mission, these institutions can 
still formulate articulated purposes, try to create a community consensus and, as 
established, gradually pass on increasing responsibilities to students (who have 
more influence over their peers than most adults).  
 There are credible fears in giving children power. Beyond the remote 
likelihood that a corps of petty tyrants will emerge, there is the stronger threat of 
inadvertently encouraging stable hierarchies of dominant and subject students; 
the latter then become a disaffected class. Such a threat can be mitigated by 
rotating roles, yet undoubtedly leaders will arise. Schools cannot prevent the 
differentiation of students. But this is not to be decried; indeed it affords another 
venue for students who may not excel elsewhere. The task is to be sure that the 
structures and processes of selection are perceived (and are) fair so that the 
capacity for leadership is nurtured. Outlets for authority and power, combined 
with a school culture perceived as fair and purposeful, will absorb a portion of 
students' drive for assertiveness and domination: a useful supplement to anti-
violence programs that attempt to inhibit such impulses.  
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